RECENT CASES
OF SA.LVOR.-The plaintiffs, former officers of the British Army on their wa to join the Army of Northern
Russia, were at Murmansk when that port was seized by the Bolshevists. In
order to save their lives, they seized the defendants' steamship which was lying
at the port, and escaped to Norway, although they could have escaped by sleigh.
In an action by the plaintiffs to recover salvage remuneration, the defendants
contended that there was lack of voluntariness which was essential to salvage.
Held: The plaintiffs were volunteers and can recover. The Lomonosoff, 37
T. L. R. 151 (1920).
Salvage is compensation given to persons by whose assistance a vessel
or her cargo is saved from impending danger or loss. Gonzales v. United
States, 42 Court of Claims Rep. 299 (1907); Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co.,
i19 U. S.625 (t887). It is said that the assistance rendered must be voluntary. The Fannie Brown, 30 Fed. 215 (1887). This element of voluntariness
is satisfied by the absence of any contractual or official obligation except in
the case of a passenger on board the vessel in distress. Thus, seamen are not
ordinarily entitled to salvage for saving their own vessel. Gilbraith et al. v.
Stewart Transp. Co., 121 Fed. 540, 57 C. C. A. 602 (z9o2);" The Neptune, i
Hlagg. Adm. 227 (Eng. 1824). Nor can public servants recover for salvage
where they are emp!oyed by the public authorities to perform the very service
for which they are endeavoring to recover. Davey v. The Mary Frost, 7 Fed.
Cas. No. 3592, 2 Woods 3o6 (1876). On the other hand, tbe crew of a vessel
may recover for performing salvage services to another vessel. The Sappho,
L. R. 3 P. C. 69o (Eng. 1871). Or they can recover for performing salvage
service to their own vessel after it has been abandoned. The Le Jonet, L. R.
3 A. & E. .556(Eng. 1872). Likewise, public servants may recover for salvage
when the services rendercd are beyond the duties which they are required to
perform. I.e Tigre, 15 Fed. Cas. No.-8281, 3 Wash. C. C. 567 (1820). IIowever, it is held that a passenger on board a ship in distress is unable to claim
as salvor except in extraordinary circumstances. The Vrede, iLush. 322 (Eng.
1861); The Branston, 2 iagg. Adm. 3, n. (Eng. 1826). The reason is that it
isthe duty of every one on board the vessel to give all the assistance he can.
The Vrede, supra.
In the principal case, the plaintiffs were neither passengers, nor were
they under any pre-existing contractual or official duty to render salvage services.to the defendants' steam.hip. The decision, therefore, would seem correct. The fact that they seized-the vessel in order to save their lives should
make no difference, since it is held that it is no objection to a claim for salvage
that the assistance of the salvor did not arise from a desire to preserve the property or benefit the owner, his motive being immaterial. Le Tigre, supra; The
B. C. Terry, 9 Fed. 920 (S81), scible. In the former case, the court said:
"The owner, whose property has been preserved from destruction by the acts
of a stranger, has no right to inquire into the motives which influenced his con(377)
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duct, provided he acted legally." Thus it would seem that if the plaintiffs in
the principal case could have escaped only by seizing the defendants' vessel,
the element of voluntariness necessary to recover for salvage would still be
satisfied.
BILLS AND
COUNT,

NOTES-PURCHASING

BANK,

A HOLDER FOR VALUE-ADDITIONAL

CREDITING DEPOSITOR'S AcDEPoSITs.-Without knowledge

of existing defects in the payee's title, plaintiff bank purchased defendant's
note from the payee and credited his checking account therewith. The payee
maintained his credit with plaintiff by additional deposits; but before the note's
maturity and before plaintiff had notice of defects, the payee -withdrew an
amount greater than his credit was immediately after plaintiff's purchase.
Ileld: Plaintiff was a holder in due course. State Savings Bank of Leavenworth v. Krug, 193 Pac. 899 (Kan. 1920).
In the United States a transferee bank which merely credits the transferor's account with the amount of a negotiable instrument does not thereby
give such value as is required of a holder in due course. Citizens' State Bank
v. Cowles, 18o N. Y. 346, 73 N. E. 33 (19o5); Merchants' National Bank v.
Marden, Orth & Hasting's Co., 125 N. F 384 (Mass. 1919); Clayton v. Bank
of East Chattanooga, 85 So. 271 (Ala. 1920).
But it is well established that in such circumstances a bank is a holder
in due course if by such credit an antecedent debt has been cancelled, Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. i (U. S. 1842); Mayer v. Heidelbaci, 123 N. Y. 332, 25 N. E.
416 (189o); or if the transferor exhaust the credit by subsequent withdrawals
before the bank learns of infirmities in the instrument. Hamilton National
Bank v. Emigh, 127 Ark. 545, 192 S. W. 913 (i917); Old National Bankof Spokane v. Gibson, io5 Wash. 578: 179 Pac. 117 (1919); N. I. L., Sec. 25 and 52.
The operation of this rule is -unaffected by additional deposits by the
transferor, even though his credit has thereby been kept at all times greater
than the amount of the instrument, because withdrawals from a checking account are charged against deposits in the order in which they were made. Fredonia National Bank v. Tommei, 131 Mich. 674, 92 N. W. 348 (igoz); First
National Bank v. McNairy, 122 Minn. 215, 142 N. W. 139 (1914).
The decision of the principal case is thus in accord with the recognized
rMle; but when such credit has been only partially drawn upon before notice,
there is a split of authority on the question of the amount that may be recovered
on the instrument. Some courts hold that a substantial withdrawal gives a
bank the rights of a holder in due course, and that it may therefore recover the
full value.of the instrument, Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. U. S. National Bank
of Portland, 187 Fed. 746, iog C. C. A. 494 (1911); Bland .v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 71 Fla. 499, 71 So. 63o (1916); and it has been suggested that any withdrawal has the same effect. Security Bank of Minn. v. Petruschke, io Minn.
478, 112 N. W. 1oo0 (1907). But the oetter view, which is the one adopted by
the N. 1. L., is that in such circumstances a.bank is a holder for value only pro
lanto. Dresser v. Construction Co., 3 Otto 92 (U. S. 1876); National Bank of
Phoenixville v. Bonsor, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 275 (tgog); N. 1. L., Sec. 27.
This question does not arise in England since it is there held, by a strict
logical development of the Law Merchant, that merely crediting the trans-
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feror's account with the amount of a negotiable instrument constitutesa transferee bank a holder for value. Carstairs v. Bates. 3 Campbell 301 (Eng. 1812);
Royal Bank of Scotland v. Tottenham, (1894) 2 Q. B. D. 75; Bills of Exchange
Act (t882) 45 & 46 Vict., Ch. 6z s. 27 (1) a.
CARRIERS-DELIVERY OF GOODS WITHOUT SURRENDER OF BILL OF LADING.

The plaintiff shipped a consignment of goods on a "consignor's order" bill of
lading. It attached thereto a draft, and sold both, indorsed in blank, to a bank.
'The bank wrongfully detached the draft and forwarded the bill of lading. On
arrival, the consignment was delivered by the terminal carrier to a bona fide
holder of the bill, but surrender of the bill of lading was not required, contrary
to an express surrender clause therein. The plaintiff brought an action against
,the initial carrier, alleging that the terminal carrier's acts constituted a conversion of the goods. Held: The loss was not the result of the failure on the
part of the carrier to take up the bill of lading, and therefore the defendant is
not liable. Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. J. F. French & Co., 41 Sup. Ct. 195
-(U. S. 1921). •

The Federal Uniform Bills of Lading Act, 39 U. S. Stat. at Large 538
(19x6), does not impose on the carrier a duty to the shipper to take up the bill
of lading. Does the delivery to.the rightful holder of the bill of lading without compliance with the surrender clause of that bill render the carrier liable
for conversion?
This is the first time that the question has come before the United States
Supreme Court. In discussing it the opinion indicates that although-there is
a conflict in the language of the cases yet the decisions are in accord. Continuing, they point out that where the failure to take up the bill of lading was
the cause of the loss recovery has been allowed and cite the following cases:
Babbitt v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 285 Ill. 267, 12o N. E. 803 (t918); Judson v.
Alinneapolis and St. Louis R. R. Co., 131 Minn. 5, 154 N. W. 5o6 (1915); Turnbull v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 183 Mich. 213, 15o N. W. 132 (1914); First Nat.
Bank v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 25 Idaho 58, 136 Pac. 798 (i913);
and where it was not the cause of the loss recovery has not-been allowed and
cite, Famous Mfg. Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 166 Iowa 361, 147
N. W. 7,54 (1914); Nelson Grain Co. v. Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 174 Mich. 8o,
140 N. W. 486 (1913); Chicago Co. v. Savannah Ry. Co., 1o3 Ga. 140, 29 S. E.
1698 (1897).
It is interesting to note that in none of the cases cited in support of the
first proposition was there a delivery to the holder of the bill; in three of the
cases delivery was made to the consigneo named in the bill, he having failed to
get possession of the bill of lading, and in the fourth, in which the bill of lading
was a consignor's order bill, to the person Who was to be notified on arrival of
the goods. In each of these cases, therefore, there was a delivery to one who
-was not legally entitled to the goods. On the other hand, in the cases cited
under the second proposition there was a delivery to the holder of the bill, which
was a delivery to the person legally entitled to the goods. It is suggested that
ihis distinction is more sound than that indicated by the court.
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CONSTITUTION.AL LAW-DuE PROCESS OF LAw-FORFEITURE OF PROP-

ERTY OF INNOCENT OWNER FOR VIOLATION OF TnE INTERNAL REVENUE LAw.-

The defendant company sold an automobile, retaining the title for the unpaid
purchase money, to a taxicab operator,, who: unknown to the defendant, used
the car for the removal of distilled spirits upon which a tax was imposed by
the United States and bad not been paid. Under Sec. 345o, Rev. St. (Comp.
St. Sec. 6352), providing for the forfeiture of every conveyance under such circumstances, a libel was filed against the automobile. The defendant company
gave bond and was permitted to replevy the car. Held: The United States
can recover the value of the car from the defendant. Grant Co. v. United
States, 41 Sup. Ct. 189 (1921).
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, in accord with the decision
of the Supreme Court in the principal case, has consistently held that an auto.
mobile, carriage, cart, etc., committed by the owner to the possession of a third
person, who uses it in the removal of goods or commodities to defraud the United
States of a tax imposed thereon, is subject to forfeiture under Sec. 345o, Rev.
St. (Comp. St. Sec. 6352), although the owner had no knowledge of such illegal
use. United States v. Mincey, 254 Fed. 287, 165 C. C. A. 575 (x918); United
States v. One Saxon Automobile et al., 257 Fed. 251, 168 C. C. A. 335 (1919);
Logan v. United States, 26o Fed. 746, 1*71C. C. A. 484 (1919). Under similar
statutes it had been held by the Supreme Court that the property was forfeited
whether the owner knew of its unlawful use or not. Dobbin's Distillery v.
United States, 96 U. S. 395, 24 L. Ed. 637 (1877);.United States v. Stowell,
133 U. S. I, 33 L. Ed. 555 (1889). The reason is that if one could protect his
property from forfeiture on proof that the legal title was in some one else, the
difficulty of enforcing the law would be greatly increased and the penalty of
forfeiture almost always evaded. United States v. One Saxon Automobile
et al, supra.
The decision of the principal iase, in view of the above authorities, is
undoubtedly correct. It is interesting, however, considered in connection with
the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution which prohibits the
taking of property without due process of law. In discussing this point, the
decisions almost invariably proceed on the ground of precedent. In Logan v.
United States, supra, the court said: "The long history of forfeitures in this
country, for violation of internal revenue and custom laws, of property, regardless of ownership, whether innocen" or guilty,. repels the idea that sucli forfeitures conflict with the owner's right to due process of law." The true reason
would seem to be the one stated in the principal case, that such provision was
necessary to provide against breaches of the revenue laws.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTEENTH AsENDMENT-DEFINITION OF INCOME

-REALIZED CAPITAL INCREASE OF PERSONALTY.-The plaintiff sued to recover
the amount of a tax, paid under protest, assessed under the Federal Income Tax
Act of 1916, on the difference between the market value on March 1, 1913, of
certain corporate shares which he owned on that date, and the amount realized by
their sale in 1917. Mcd: The District Court prolx-rly sustained the demurrer
to the declaration, as that which is here taxed is income within the meaning of
the Act anl the Sixteenth Amendment. Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v.
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Smietanka, Collector, No. 6o8, October Term, 1920, U. S. Supreme Court,
decided March 28, 1921.
For a full discussion of Walsh, Collector v. Brewster, No. 742, Oct. Term,
192o, decided at the same time on the authority of the foregoing case, see 69
U. of Pa. Law Rev. 253.
In these cases an unanimous court reiterates, as the constitutional definition of "income," that laid down in Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231
U. S, 399, 415 (1913), and supplemented in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189,
207 (1920)-" the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,
provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion
of capital assets."
The contentions that a trustee was not a "taxable person" within the
meaning of the Act and that the Act did not contemplate the taxation of such
a gain were answered by citing the language of the Act. To the contention
that such a gain was not income to the private investor but only to the dealer,
the court replied that no such distinction had ever been recognized by the Federal Government in statute, judicial decision or departmental practice, and
they refused now "to enter into the-refinements of lexicographers and econom-iq." Of Gray v. Darlington. is Wall. 63 (1872), upon the authority of
which the lower court decided Walsh v Brewster, supra, it was said that differences in statutes rendered quotations from that case inapplicable.
In Goodrich v. Edwards, Collector, No. 663, Oct. Term, 192o, decided at
the same time, and in Walsh v. Brewster, supra, the tax was levied in certain
instances on the difference between the value of stocks and bonds as of March t,
1913, and the amount realized by theirsubsequent sale, though this latteramount
was actually less than the original cost to the investor. Quoting the Act and
the definition in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, the court points out that the statute
imposes the tax on the proceeds of the sale of personal property to the extent
only that gains are derived therefrom by the vendor.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE MUST PRESCRIBE ASCERTAINABLESTAND-

ARD OF CoNucT-LEvER ACT INvALID.-The defendant was indicted under the
Lever Act (Act of October 22, 1919, 41 Stat. L. 397), the indictment being laid

in the words of the statute which made it unlawful "to make any unjust or
unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries."
No standard was set by the statute as to what constituted a just or reasonable
charge. On the defendant's demurring to the indictment, held, demurrer sustained, as the statute denied the defendant due process of law and violated the
guarantee tf the Sixth Amendment in that it did not prescribe an ascertainable
standard of guilt whereby an accused mgfit know the nature and cause of the
accusation lodged against him. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Company,
Adv. Op. Supreme Court No. 324, October Term, 1920.
The majority of the lower Federal courts had upheld the validity of this
particular provision of the Lever Act. 69 Univ. of Pa. Law Review 6o. In
the instant case, however, an unanimous vote of the Supreme Court declared the
provision invalid, the decision apparently viewing the case as being controlled
by International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216 (1913), wherein it
was decided that a state statute which r.made it unlawful to enhance or depreci-
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ate the price of a commodity either above or below its "real value" was invalid'
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court brushed aside with little or no.
comment the contention of the government that the statute was valid in view
of the decision in the case of Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (s912), in
which it was held that criminal prosecutions might be instituted under the
Sherman Act for "unreasonable restraints of trade." It would appear that no
standard of reasonableness was set by the latter statute, an objection which
was the basis of the decision in the principal case.
EVIDENCE-COMPETENCY OF DIVORCED WIFE TO TESTIFY AGAINST HER
HUSBAND-PRIVILEGED COMM UNICATIoNs.-In an action for alienation of affec-

tions, begun after divorce, the defendant offered the plaintiff's divorced wife as
a witness. Held: That after the marital relation has been terminated, a statute
prohibiting the testimony of either spouse against the other without the other's
consent, excludes only privileged communications." Patterson v. Hill, 18o
N. W. 352 (Mich. 1920).
At common law, testimony by either spouse against the other was excluded, except in actions based on the commission of a personal wroug by one,
spouse against the other. Co. Litt. 6, b (1628); Lord Audley's Case, 3 How.
St. Tr. 401 (Eng. i631); I BI. Coin. 443 (1768); Davis v. Dinwoody, 4 T. R.
678 (Eng. 1792); Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio St. 87 (1877). This rule was basecd
on the probable danger of causing marital dissensions by admitting such testimony, and on a natural repugnance of fair-minded people to convicting one
spouse on the other's testimony. Barker v. Dixie, Lee cas. t. Hardwicke 264
tEng. 1736); Mills v. U. S., I Pinney 73 (Wis. 1839); Wigmore on Ev., sec. 2228,
(104).

Neither of these reasons wotld-apply after the termination of the maritar
relation; and so it.
was generally held that after a divorce or the death of one
spouse, the testimony of one spouse against the other was admissible, even
though it related to facts which occurred during the continuance of the marital
relation. Mercer v. Patterson, 41 Ind. 440 (1872); Stephens v. Cotterell, 99
Pa. I88 (1881); State v. Mathews, 133 Iowa 398, io9 N. W. 616 (1907); Curd
v. State, 217 S. W. 1043 (Tex. 192o). But this conclusion was not always accepted. Kimbrough v. Mitchell, I Head 539 (Tenn. 1858); State v. Kodat,.
158 Mo. 125, 59 S. W. 73, 81 Am. St. Rep. 292, 51 L. R. A. 509 (1900).

"Confidential communications" between husband and wife were always
privileged at common law, and it was generally held that all communications
between husband and wife should be presumed confidential until proved otherwise. Doker v. Hasler, R. & M. 198 (Eng. 1824); Robin v. King, 2 Leigh 140
(Va. 183o); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U. S. 209 (1839); Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425

(1885).
This rule has been codified in almost every jurisdiction, and frequently
the element of confidence is not expressly named in the enactment: "any communications" are privileged; e. g., N. I. Pub. Lawsi C. 224, sec. 20 (1901); I
Burns Ann. Stats. Ind., sec. 520, sub-sec. 6 (1914). Such a statute is sometimes construed as extending the privilege even to communications proved not
to have been intended to be confidential. Campbell v. Chace, 12 R. 1. 333
(1879); Leppla v. Tribune Co., 35 Minn. 3io, 29 N. W. 127 (i886Y. But the-
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weight of authority favors a limitation of the privilege to confidential communications. lagerman v. Wigent, io8 Mich. 192, 65 N. W. 756 (1896); Sexton
v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, io5 N. W. 314, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 708 (19o5); Kraeger
v. Kraeger, 125 N. E. 484 (Ind. 1919).
Some statutes expressly extend the privilege to "transactions" which
came to the spouse's knowledge by reason of the marital relation. 3 Gen. Code
of Ohio, sec. 11494 (xgio); Thompson's Shannon's Code of Tenn., sec. 5596
(191o).
But in the absence of such a statute, most courts grant the privilege
only to verbal and written communications. Harlan v. Moore, 132 Mo. 483,
34 S. W. 70 (1895); In re Est. of Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193, 72 Pac. 942 (1903);
In re Pusey's Est., x8x Pac. 648 (Cal. 1919).
Some courts, however, extend it to include such transactions without
the aid of a statute, holding, apparently, that knowledge of a fact acquired
in the marital relation, whether by communication of information by the other
spouse, participation in a transaction, or mere observation and inference, has
passed through a confidential channel, which deserves the protection of the
privilege. Perry v. Randall, 83 Ind. 143 (1882); Griffith v. Griffith, 162 III.
368, 44 N. E. 820 (1896); Allcock v. Allcock, 174 Ky. 665, 192 S. %. 853 (1917).

The decision in the principal case is in accord with the best modern view;
but it is apparent that the term "privileged communications" needs precise
definition. It is suggested that a limitation of the privilege to confidential
communications, and the exclusion from the privilege of-mere transactions
between husband and wife would provide the most satisfactory basis for such a
definition.
EvIDECE-INADMISS1IILITY OF SUBSEQUENT ACT TO PROVE CRIMINAL

INTxrT.-A physician was indicted for the offense of murder by abortion. To
prove a criminal intent, and to rebut the defense of necessity, the prosecution
introduced evidence to show that several months later, the prisoner performed
a similar operation upon the same woman. Hleld: The evidence was inad.
missible, since it was not proved that the child was quick. The subsequent
act not being indictable, it cannot be used to prove the intent of the abortion
charged. State v. Bassett, 194 Pac. 867 (N. M. 1921).
The general rule is that when a man is put on trial for one crime, proof
of his guilt of other crimes must be excluded. I Bishop's New Cr. Proc., Par.
112o. But when the proof of other acts or crimes tends to establish motive,
intent, or absence of mistake or accident, it is generally admissible. People
v. Molineaux, 16S N. Y. 264. 6t N. E. 286 (19o1); Wharton's Crim. Ev. 848.
In the principal case, the court -refused to admit the evidence because
the second act did not constitute the indictable offense of abortion. This decision is against the great weight of authority, the courts admitting evidence of
other acts, regardless of whether or not they are technically indictable as crimes.
Clark v. People, 224 Ill. 554, 79 N. E. 941 (19o6); People v. Seaman, 107 Mich.
348, 65 N. W. 203 (1895). It is only necessary that both acts should be substantially similar in character. State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 136 S. W. 316
(1910).

The reasoning of the court in the principal case, it is submitted, clearly
showA a misconception of the general rule stated above. Proof of any act,
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conduct, or declarations of an accused person is admissible if it tends to establish intention, knowledge or motive, and it is not necessary that they should
be criminally indictable. In fact, they are all the more admissible if they are
not, since they are less likely to prejudice the jury.
EVIDENCE-STATEMENT OF INTENTION AS PART OF THE RES GEsTAE.The deceased man, for whose murder the defendant was indicted, told his wife,
when leaving home about an hour before he met his death, that he intended
to meet the defendant. theld: That this statement was adm;ssible in evidence
as part of the res gestae. Commonwealth v. Palma, 268 Pa. 434, 112 AtI. 26
(1920).

Declarations of one's own present-existing state of mind, made in a natural manner and not under circumstances of suspicion, are generally held admissible to prove the state of mind, whenever it is relevant, either as a fact in
issue in the case, or as evidence from which, in turn, a fact in issue can be inferred. Doed. Shallcross v. Palmer, x6Q. B. 747 (Eng. i85i);Com. v.Trefethen,
157 Mass. i85, 31 N. E. 961 (1892); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S.
285, 12 U. S. Sup. Ct. 909 (1892); Farrar v. Locomotive Engineers' Mut. Life &
Accident Ins. Assn., 173 N. W. 705 (Minn. 1919); In re Carson's Est., 194 Pac.
.5 (Cal. 1920). Since the declarations are admitted to prove the facts stated
-therein, their adm*ssion constitutes an exception to the rule against hearsay.
Coleman v. Southwick, 9 John. 45 (N. Y. 1812); Wigmore on Ev., sec. 1361,
1768.
This exception is analogous to the exception in favor of spontaneous
statements of present-existing physical pain: both kinds of statements are admitted because the circumstances under which they were made gives them a
credibility actually greater than could be attributed to direct testimony as to
the facts they assert, if such direct testimony were available. DuBost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. Six (Eng. 18io); Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397 (U. S. 1869);
'Wigmore on Ev., sec. 1714.
lowever, some courts disregard the existence of the well-founded exception to the rule against hearsay in favor of declarations of present-existing state
of mind, and endeavor to relate such a declaration to some act, independently
material to the issue in the case whose legal meaning was uncertain or indefinite.
If the declaration can be related to an act which in the court's opinion satisfies
these requirements, it is admitted as "part of the res gestae." Viles v. Waltham, 157 Mass. 542, 32 N. E. 9oi (1893); State v. Giudice, 170 Iowa 73!, 153
N. W. 336 (1915); McKay v. McKay, 189 S. W. 520 (Tex. 1916). If not, it
is exclmcled. Com. v. Felch, 132 Mass. 222 (t882); Chicago & E. 1. R. Co. v.
Chancellor. 165 Ill. 438, 46 N. E. 269 (1897). In the principal case, the statement of the deceased's intention was related to his act in leaving his home,
but this act, taken by itself, had no real productive value in determining the
is.-ue, whether or not he was murdered by the defendant. %%,hcre courts refuse
to recognize the exception admitting declarations of a mental state, they are
often thus forced to consider as material an act which is really of no great pro.
bative value, in order to admit such declarationsas part of its resgestae. Hunter
v. State, 40 N. 3. 1.. 495 (t878); Chase v. Lowell, 151 Mass. 422, 24 N. E. 212
(189o); State v. Gindlice, supra; Porter v. State, 215 S. W. 201 (Tex. 1919).
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The exception to the hearsay rule admitting declarations of a state of
mind is founded on sound reasoning; and it is submitted that the recognition
of this distinct exception, and the abandoning of the res ge~tae doctrine as a
justification for admitting such declarations, will both place this evidence on a
sounder basis and restrict the prevailing tendency to extend the res gestae doctrine beyond all logical boundaries. See State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474,
65 N. W. 63 (1895).
FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S

LIABILITY ACT-"'COMMON CARRIER

BY RAIL-

plaintiff express company brought a bill
to enjoin the defendant from enforcing a judgment, recovered for injuries, against
the railroad which carried the plaintiff's express matter. The plaintiff's case
rested on its contract with the defendant by which he agreed to hold neither
the plaintiff nor the railroad liable for any injuries. The defendant contended
that the contract was void under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. Held:
The provisions of the Act are not applicable to express companies. The contract is valid, relief granted. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 41 Sup. Ct. 93 (U. S.
ROAD"-ExPRESS COMPANIES.-The

t920).

This is the first time that the Supreme Court has decided that the terms
"common carrier by railroad" of the Employer's Liability Act of April 22, 19o8,
c. 149, 35 U. S. Stat. at L. 65, do not cover express companies not operated by
a railroad. The express company does not carry by railroad, but contracts
with a railroad to do that part of its business.- So although an express company is a common carrier, Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Exp. Co., 93 U. S. 174
(1876); Grogan & Merz v. Adams Exp. Co., 114 Pa. 523, 7 Atl. 134 (1886), yet
it can not properly be called a common carrier by railroad. The same conclusion has been reached under this act in New Jersey, Higgins'v. Erie R. R. Co.
and Wells Fargo & Co., 89 N. J. L. 629, 99 At. 9o (1916), and in Minnesota
under a similarly worded statute of that State, State ex rel. v. District Court,
142 Minn. 410, 172 N. W. 3io (I919).
The court in the principal case said that its view was enforced by reference in the Act to engines, cars, tracks, roadbeds and other property pertaining
to a railroad. A similar construction was given to the original-Interstate Commierce Act which contained similar terms. Re Express Cases, I Interst. Com.
Com'm. R'ep. 677 (1887); Southern Indiana Exp. Co. v. United States Exp.
Co., 88 Fed. 659 (1898).
INTERNATIONAL LAw-ATTESTATION BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT THROUGH

AMIc CuRIAE.-Counsel for the British Embassy appeared as amid curiae and
suggested that the process of arrest against the ship "Gleneden" -should be
quashed and jurisdiction over her declined because she was an admiralty transport in the service of the British Government. Held: The suggestion is not
conclusive of the facts it states, because it was not made through the executive
department of the United States. In re Muir, The Gleneden, 41 U. S. Sup.
Ct. Rep. 185 (1921).
As a matter of international comity, each state declines to exercise by
its courts jurisdiction over ships, armed or unarmed, which come within its
territorial jurisdiction while in the public service of a foreign government. Tie
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Parliament Beige, (1879) L. R. 5 P. D. 197; The Exchange, 7 Cranch ix6 (U. S.
1812). A foreign government may appear in the suit and raise the jurisdictional question, The Sapphire, i i Wall. 164 (U.S. 1871); Colombia v. Cauca
Co., 190 U. S. 524 (19o3); or its accredited and recognized representative may,
with his government's authority, take this step in its interest. The Anne,
3 Wheat. 435 1U. S. 18x8). If the foreign government properly attests the
fact that the ship is a public vessel of the state, the court will not go behind
this declaration nor allow it to be questioned. The Constitution, (1879) L. R.
4 P. D. 39; The Exchange, supra. This is the case even where on the acknowledged facts there may be reasonable doubt as to whether the vessel is so employed as to be in the public service of the state in a proper sense of the term.
The Parliament BeIge, supra.
In the principal case, the court did not think that the statement, made
as it was by private counsel for the British Embassy appearing as amici curiae,
was a proper attestation by the British Government of the fact. They therefore refused to consider it conclusive. They said: "It was open to that government to make the asserted public status and immunity of the vessel the subject
of diplomatic representations to the end that, if the claim was recognized by the
executive department of this government, it might be set forth and supported
in an appropriate suggestion to the court by the Attorney General, or some law
officer acting under his direction." This seems to have been the method adopted
in previous cases. The Constitution, supra; The Parlement Beige, supra;
The Exchange, supra; The Pizarro, .i9Fed. Cas. 786, No. t1, 199 (1852); The
Luigi, 23o Fed. Rep. 493 (1916).
JURY SERVtCE-ELtGIBILITY OF WO.tEN.-The defendant appealed from
a conviction of larceny and assigned as error the presence of women on the jury.
Hlid: The selection of women for the jury was not error. People v. Baritz, 18o
N. W. 423 (Mich."1920).
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a trial by jury mean a trial by
a jury as known at common law. Saginaw v. Campau, 102 Mich. 594, 61 N. W.
65 (1894); Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 68 N. W. 53
(1896); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1913). But the qualifications of jurors is a matter subject to legislative control and even though
!uuch qualifications may differ from those at common law, such legislation is
nevertheless a valid exercise of the legislative power. State v. Slover, 134 Mo.
607, 36 S. W. 50 (i896); saginaw v. Campau, supra. A legislature may therefore at any time change the qualifications of the persons subject to and eligible
for jur) service.
The question therefore involved in the principal case, as to eligibility for
jury service, is purely a statutory one and is dependent on the statutes in the
various jurisdictions. In the principal case it was held that the granting of
suffrage to women brought them within the provisions of the Michigan statute
and made them eligible for jury service. An opposite conclusion was reached
in regard to the New York statute in the case of In re Grilli, 1iO Misc. Rep.
45, 179 N. Y. S. 795 (1920). It was there held that the granting of suffrage was
not sufficient to bring women within the provisions Of the New York statuteso as to make them eligible for jury service. In a recent California case the-
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question arose as to whether a statute expressly making women eligible for jury
service was constitutional. The court held that it was in violation of neither
the State nor the Federal Constitution. In re Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172 Pac.
986 (1918).
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASE DETERMINABLE BY LESSEE OLY.-A
lease for two years contained a covenant that the lease should continue thereafter from year to year until the lessee should give written notice of his intention
to terminate it. The tenant held for eight years, and the lessor notified him to
vacate. Held: Such notice was without legal effect since only the lessee could
terminate the lease. Carlisle v. Weiscopf, 129 N. E. 375 (Mass. 1921).
Courts are generally opposed to leases containing covenants for perpetual
renewals and make every effort to construe them so as to avoid creating a perpetuity. Hoadley v. Bayntum, 31 West. L. Rep. 751 (Can. 1915); Diffen.
derfer v. Board of Public Schools, 120 Mo. 447, 25 S. W. 542 (1894); Brush v.
Beecher, io Mich. 597, 68 N. W. 420 (1896). The general rule is that a covenant in general terms to grant, at the option of the lessee, a new lease containing the same covenants and agreements as the original lease, is fully satisfied
by a lease containing all such covenants except that of renewal. The effect of
such a covenant is thus limited to a single renewal. Lewis v. Stephenson, 67
L. J. 296 (Eng. z898); Drake v. Board of Education, 208 MO. 540, 106 S. WV.
650 (1907); Karn v. di Lorenzo, tii AtI. 195 (Conn. 1920).
Although the chief objection to a covenant making a lease perpetually
renewable seems to be based on the idea that the leasehold will be a perpetuity
and so "against the policy of the law," Morrison v. Rossignol, 5 Cal. 64 (1855);"
yet, where there is a provision in a lease for extension of the term at the lessee's
option, there is, upon the exercise of that option, a present demise for the full
term. Neal v. Harris, 216 S. W. 6 (Ark. i919); Kahn v. American Stores Co.,,
110 At]. 562 (N. J. 1920); Briggs v. Bloomingdale Cemetery Co., 185 N. Y. S.
348 (192o). Thus, since the covenant for renewal runs with the land, Leppla
v. Mackey, 31 Minn. 75, x6 N. W. 470 (1883); Cook v. Jones, 96 Ky. 283, 28
S. W. 96o (1894); McClintock v. Joyner, 77 Miss. 678, 27 So. 837 (10oo); and
since the interest of the lessee in the land is always vested, the rule against perpetuities is inapplicable. Bridges v. Hitchcock, 5 Bro. Parl. Cas. 6 (Eng. 1715)"
Muller v. Trafford, (i90) i Ch. D. 54; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities,
3rd ed., 1 230.
But the right to create a perpetual lease has always been recognized;Bridges v. Hitchcock, supra; Copper Mining Co. v. Beach, 13 Bear. 478 (Eng.
1823); and occasionally in England, though more frequently in Ireland, such
leases take the form of grants for lives renewable forever. Pilkington v. Gore,
8 Ir. Ch. R. 589 (Ireland 1858); Hare v. Burges, 4 K. & J. 45 (Eng. 1857); Swinburne v. Milburn, 9 App. Cas. 844, 855 (Eng. 1884). However, courts wilt
give full effect to covenants making leases perpetual only when the intention
of the parties to create a right of perpetual renewal is clearly and rnequivocally
expressed; Nicholson v. Smith, 22 Ch. D. 640 (Eng. 1'882); Swinburne v. Milburn, supra; Swigert v. Hartzell, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 56 (1902); Copiah HardwareCo. v. Johnson, 86 So. 369 (Miss. 1920); as where "this present covenant" isexpressly included in the renewal clause. Hare v. Burges, supra.
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In the principal case the parties provided for a perpetual lease, subject
to a right of determination in the lessee; and it is submitted that such a lease
is no more "against the policy of the law" than is a determinable fee. Nor can
the lessor complain of the terms of his own lease, Stetler v. North Branch Transit
Co., 258 Pa. 299, iox At. 98o (1917); Burgener v. O'Halloran, ii Misc. Rep.
203, i81 N. Y. S. 235 (x92o); especially since they may work as well for his
interests as against them. Dix v. Atkins, 130 Mass. 171 (x881); Megargee v.
Longaker, Prentice Co., io Pa. Super. Ct. 491 (1899).
LANDLORD AND TENANT-PRIVILEGE OF RENEWAL OF LEAsE-NoTIcE
OF INTENTION TO SURREDER.-The defendant held under a lease for one year

providing that if he held over with the lessor's consent, "it shall be deemed a
renewal of this lease . . . for the term of another year, and so on from year
to year until the lease is terminated by" either party giving three months notice.
The defendant left at the end of the second year without giving notice. The
plaintiff lessor sues to recover rent for the third year. Held: No notice was
necessary to terminate the lease at the end of the second year. Baxter v. Maull,
75 Pa. Super. Ct. 168 (1920).
Notice of intention to remove at the end of the first year was not necessary, MacGregor v. Rawle, 57 Pa. 184 (x868), for notice is not required to terminate a lease at the end of the fixed term. Right v.Darby, i T. R. 159 (Eng.
1786); Cox v. Sammis, 57 N. Y. App. Div. 173, 68 N. Y. Supp. 203 (19o).
The majority opinion in the principal case construed the provision for notice
to apply only to the words, "and so on from year to year," and not to relate back
to the immediately preceding words, "for the term of another year." The
result is that notice was not necessary until after the expiration of the additional
year. The judges considered the case controlled by Ashhurst v. Phonograph
Co., i66 Pa. 357, 31 Atl. 116 (i895).' As is pointed out in the dissenting opinion, Ashhurst v. Phonograph Co., supra, is clearly distinguishable from this
case, the wording of the lease being significantly different. The dissenting judges
emphasized the purpose of the introduction of the clause, to fix the rights of
the parties in the event of a holding over after the expiration of the term certain.
To quote them: "The manifest intention was to provide for a general tenancy
from year to year, subject to the covenants of the lease. . . . Grammatically the condition of defeasance is applicable to all the prior clauses of the sentence, and there is nothing to indicate the intention of the parties to restrict
such application." Wilcox v. Montour Iron & Steel Co., t47 Pa. 540, 23 AtL
840 (1892).
M|ARRIAGE-ANI'LMENT-TRIENIAL COHABiTATIou.-In a suit by a wife
for the annulment of her marriage propter impofentiam the evidence as to the
husband's ability was conflicting. The wife proved cohabitation for a period
of over three years and that she was still a virgin and apt. Held: Annulment
of marriage decreed. Proof of virgo intaeta elapta viro after three years' cohabitation is sufficient to raise a presumption of the husband's incompetency.
Tompkins v. Tompkins, i i i Atl. 599 (N. J. E. 192o).
The doctrine of "triennial cohabitation" invoked in the principal case
has its foundation in the civil law. This- presumption has been. steadfastly
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adhered to in England as it was a part of the law applied in the Ecclesiastical
courts which had sole jurisdiction over marriage and divorce. Lewis v. Hayward, 35 L. J. (N. S.) Prob. M. & D. 1o5 (Eng. 1866). As the Ecclesiastical
law was never introduced into this country as a part of the Common Law, this
presumption has never before been indulged in by our courts. Griffeth. v.
Griffeth, 162 I1. 368, 44 N. E. 820 (1896). This presumption can arise only
after a period of three years' cohabitation, Lewis v. Hayward, supra, and always
yields to proof of the actual facts. Marshall v. Hamilton, xo L. T. Rep. N. S.
787 (Eng. 1864); A. v. B. i Spinks 12 (Eng. 1853).
Although this doctrine has never before been invoked by-our courts, there
is no reason why the principal case should not be followed in this country. Considering the difficulty of proof in such cases and the importance of the issues
involved, this is assuredly a salutary innovation into the principles of our jurisprudence which will tend to facilitate the administration of justice.
NEGLIGENCE-LIAIILITY OF MAKER-VENDOR OF DEFECTIVE
MENTALITY-INIURY TO THIRD PERsON.-Defendant railroad built

INSTRU-

and sold
to the United States connecting tracks into an army cantonment. They were
accepted, although so negligently constructed as.to be grossly and obviously
unsafe. No repairs were made, and plaintiffs' decedents, while travelling under
military orders, were killed in a derailment. 1Held: There was abundant evidence of negligence for the jury. Bryson v. Hines el al., 268 Fed. 290 (C. C. A.
1920).

It is a general rule of law that the maker, vendor, or lessor of a defective
chattel is only liable for injuries resulting from that defect, after sale orlease,
to the purchaser or lessee, and not to third, persons. Curtin v. Somerset, 140
Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (1891); Heizer v. Kingsland Co., 11o Mo. 6o5, 19 S. W. 63o
(1892); Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237
(1903).
A general exception to this rule holds liable to third persons any one who
sells or delivers an article known to be imminently dangerous to life or limb,
without notice of its qualities. Downer v. Wellington Oil Co., 1o4 Mass. 64
(1870); Clarke v. Army and Navy Stores, L. R. (19o3), i K. B. 155. This
exception has been extended so as to render the vendor liable to third persons
whom he knows will use the defective article without knowing of the danger,
even though he has given notice to the immediate vendee. Waters-PierceOil
Co. v. Desels, 212 U. S. 159, 29 Sup. Ct. 270, 53 L. Ed. 453 (19o9); O'Brien
v. American Bridge Co., 11o Minn. 364, 125 N. WV.1012 (1910).

It is under

this extension of the exception that defendant railroad is held liable in the principal case.
Although the decision in the principal case is clearly correct, it seems questionable whether it has been based on the best possible grounds. Here, because
of the patent character of the defect, the vendee was necessarily charged with
knowledge of it. The attendant circumstances, however, were such as to render
notice or knowledge of the defect entirely nugatory. The defendant knew that
the United States was under circumstantial compulsion to accept and use the
track, as soon as tendered. It was, therefore, a tort as to third persons who
would neces.:arily use it, to tender the track in a defective condition.
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However, this reasoning is even more applicable to the defendant in his
capacity of maker of the defective instrumentality. If it is tortious to merely
sell such an article, how much" more so to be the creator of it. It was early
said that "it is the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly
as he ought." Fitzherbert: De Natura Brevium, 94D (1537). This duty.
unlike the general obligation of a vendor, does not spring from a contract, but
is imposed by law on all persons engaging in a business in which lack of care
may cause harm to others. Hence it is a duty to third persons, since they are
among those who may be injured by such lack of care. The construction of
tracks is clearly such a business as is required to raise this duty. It would have
been better, in the principal case, to base the defendant's liability on this fundamental-duty, rather than on a collateral duty of a vendor.
PLEDGEs-AuTOMOBILE-NECESSITY OF DELIVERY OF PossEsstos.-A
sales company pledged an automobile to a bank as collateral security fora promissory note, retaining possession of the automobile upon executing a collateral
acknowledgment that they held it as the bank's trustees and agents. A receiver being appointed for the sales company and selling the automobile, the
bank claimed the proceeds. Held: the transaction was not a pledge, since
there was no delivery of possession; but the agreement created an equitable
lien which the bank might satisfy out of the proceeds of the receiver's sale.
Fletcher Bank v. McDermid, 128 N. E. 687 (Ind. App. 1920).
There have been few cases dealing with the ittemptei pledge of an automobile without delivery of possession. Failure to deliver possession prevented
a pledge in Re Automobile Livery Service, 176 Fed. 792 (igio), and in Davis v.
Billings, 2S4 Pa. 574, 99 At. x63 (1916), although in both, as in the principal
case, the contract was held to have created an equitable lien in favor of the
pledgee. In Wiles v. Elliotte7, 215 Fed. 340 (1914), a pledgee was held not to
have parted with possession by keeping the automobile in the garage of the
pledgor, it being determined that the pledgor held the car as bailee and not as
owner. So a pledgee was held to have retained possession, although the ptedgor,
who was in his employ as a driver of his auto-stage line, had control of the car.
Manor v. Dunfield, 33 Cal. App. 557, 165 Pac. 983 (1917).
It was urged by counsel in the principal case .that an automobile comes
within that class of chattels which, because of their bulky character, need not
be actually delivered to make a pledge of them valid: but it was answered that
an automobile, while it is bulky, is easily delivered, being movable by its own
power. Other reasons urged for treating the transaction as a pledge included:
the great activity in the manufacture and sale of automobiles, the consequent
demand for financial assistance through pledging them as security, and the
great inconvenience to a pledgee in caring for them. But it is proper that these
practical considerations should not affect the settled point of law involved.
It is elemental that delivery of possession is necessary to constitute a valid
'pledge, and logically there is no reason why this element should be disregarded
in the case of automobiles.
PRACTIcE-FAcTs ADMITTED 1%PLEADINGS AS EVWENCE UN-DER PRACTICE
AcT OF 1915.-Plaintiff, to prove the existence of the contract sued on, tendered
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in evidence certain relevant averments of the statement of claim, with admissions
concerning it contained in the affidavit of defense. On review of the refusal
of a motion to take off a non-suit, there was no assignment of error attacking
the admission of the evidence, fIeld: The record must be accepted as made
with the facts as they appear in evidence, whether rightfully or wrongfully admitted, appellant not having assigned the acceptance of these proofs as error.
Buehler v. United States Fashion Plate Co. (Pa. Supreme Court, 1921, not yet
reported).
This decision, in laying down certain guiding rules of practice, clarifies
a point left open by the Practice Act of 19z5 (P. L. 483), as to the extent to
which admissions in the pleadings are evidence for purposes of trial. The'Act
provides by section 6 that "every allegation in plaintiff's statement . . . if
not denied specifically or by necessary implication in the affidavit of defense
• . . shall be taken to be admitted." The court in its opinion states that
while a fact averred in the statement of claim and pot specifically denied in the
affidavit of defense is an admitted fact, it does not become such for purposes of
trial unless put before the jury in one of three ways: (i) by the presiding judge
stating to the official stenographer, in the presence of counsel, that certain facts,
which he details and. directs to be placed on the notes of trial, are averred in
the statement and not denied in the affidavit, and hence must be treated as
admitted; or (2) by counsel directing to be placed on such notes certain detailed
facts, which they admit; or (3) by offering in evidence specific parts of the statement of claim, with what counsel conceive to be the replies thereto contained
in the affidavit of defense, and having the facts thus sought to be established
placed on the notes of trial as admitted, because averred in the-statement and
not denied in the affidavit.
This point had not before been definitely settled by the Supreme Court.
The decision in an earlier case showed a contrary inclination where on a rule
for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense it was held that under
the Act the undisputed facts appearing by the pleadings are admitted for all
purposes of the case. Federal Sales Co. v. Farrell, 264 Pa. 149 (i919). And
in another case the Washington County Court had reached the opposite conclusion in holding that if averments are not denied they are taken to be ad.
mitted for all the purposes for which the affidavit is required to be filed; and
that if the case be on trial before a jury, then every allegation of fact not denied
as aforesaid is to be treated as admitted for the purposes of the trial. Herron
v. Florence Presbyterian Church, 46 C. C. 287 (Pa. x918); 35 Lane. 240; 27
D. R. 1025.
SALES-EXPRESS ,VARRANTY-AS TO A FUTURE FAcT.-Plaintiff brought
an action to recover the purchase price of a quantity of seeds delivered to the
defendant. The defendant set up that the plaintiff warranted the seeds would
grow; that the seeds failed to germinate and therefore on account of his breach
of warranty the plaintiff could not recover. ield: There was a breach of warranty and the plaintiff could not recover on the contract. Western Soil Bacteria
Company v. O'Brien Bros. Inc., 194 Pac. 72 (Cal. 1920).
The rule as laid down by Blackstone was that "a warranty can only reach
the things in being at the time of the warranty made. and not the things in

392

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

futuro, as that a horse is sound at the buying of him and not that he will be
sound two years hence." 3 Comm. 165. \Whie there is a tendency to get
away from the Blackstonian conception, nevertheless in the ordinary contract
of sale a warranty is generally held to apply only to that state of things existing
at the time the warranty was made. Stamm v. Kuhlman, x Mo..App. 296
(1876); Leggat v. Sands Ale Brewing Co., 6o 111.159 (1871). However, if the
words are explicit that the warranty should attach as to a'future event, there
would seem to be no reason why it should not be considered valid and some
courts are inclined to take this view. Conger v. Chamberlain, 14 Wis..259,
semble, (1861). Zinn v. Hyatt, 6o Mo. App. 627 (1895), as to thle future capacity of an animal. Fitzgerald v. Evans, 49 Minn. 541, 52 N. W. 143 (1892),
that a blemish on a horse would disappear.
A warranty that seeds would grow has generally been held to be a good
warranty. Cline v. Mock, i5o Mo. App. 431, 131, S. W. 710 (1910); Shaw v.
Smith, 45 Kan. 334, 25 Pac. 886 (1891). Although this would seem to be a
warranty as to a future event, and the courts could properly so decide, it is not,
as a rule, considered such. The view has been taken that it is a warranty of
the germinating power of the seeds, which is a warranty of their present capabilities to grow and therefore a warranty of a present fact. Rieger v. Worth,
127 N. C. 230; 37 S. E. 217 (1900); Landreth v. WVyckoff, 67 N. Y. App. 145;
73 N. Y Supp. 388 (1901).
The principal case might properly have been considered as an express.
warranty with regard to a future fact. As such it would have been an excellent
example of the modification of the Blackstonian rule. However, from the
court's reasoning it is not apparent whether they took this view, or whether
they relied on those cases which consider such a warranty a representation as
to the germinating power of the seeds. While it can undoubtedly be said the
case'is correctly decided, it is to be'regretted that the court did not state on
what theory its conclusion was based.
VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-NATURE

OF THE

EIMPLOYSIET.-The crane, on which the injured employee worked, was being
used for unloading coal cars in the defendant's yard, so as to create a coal reserve
which could be used in both interstate and intrastate commerce in case. of a
threatened strike. Held: The employee could not recover under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act since the crane was not being used in interstate commerce. Koziinko v. Hines, Director General of Railroads, 268 Fed. 507 (1920).
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the true test for
determining the character of the employment is: WVas the employee at the
time of injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related
to it as to be practically a part of it? Pederson v. Del., Lack. & West. R. R.,
229 U. S. 146; Shanks v. Del., Lack. & West. R. R., 239 U. S. 556 (i9tS). By
tfie application of this test, the employee was held to be engaged in interstate
commerce, where he was carrying bolts to repair a bridge which was regularly
used in both interstate and intrastate commerce, Pederson v. Del., Lack. & Vest.
R. R., supra;and where he was operating a pump which filled a tank from which
engines in.both commerces were supplied. Erie Railroad Company v. Collins,
253 U. S. 77 (1920). These cases seemed to turn upon the fact that the work

